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CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR CHICAGO POLICE
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Conflict Resolution for Chicago Police and Community: Healing A
Constitutional Crisis at the “Thirteenth Floor” Through Native
American Reparative Justice2
By Stephanie Brinson
Bless the poets, the workers for justice,
the dancers of ceremony, the singers of heartache,
the visionaries, all makers and carriers of fresh
meaning—We will all make it through,
despite politics and wars, despite failures
and misunderstandings. There is only love.
— Joy Harjo, Conflict Resolution for Holy Beings3
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a 1996 speech entitled “Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts”
given at the Ninth Indian Sovereignty Symposium, United States Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor suggested that the “development of different methods
of solving disputes in tribal legal systems . . . hold up an example to the [rest of the]
nation about the possibilities of alternative dispute resolution” and “may offer models
for the entire nation to follow.”4 She further noted that “the adversarial process is
often not the best means to a fair outcome” especially in disputes related to “family
issues, particularly related to children . . . [and] criminal matters . . .”5 Today, in
Chicago, the adversarial process of litigation does not conclude with fair outcomes
related to longstanding disputes involving constitutional and criminal matters
between police and minority communities. Accordingly, the City of Chicago would be
well-advised to heed Justice O’Connor’s sage advice to develop a different method
mirroring tribal legal systems for solving these disputes in a way that achieves just
and fair resolutions.
Currently, a crisis hangs in Chicago balanced on a precarious fulcrum weighing two
competing constitutional rights. On one end of the tense balance is the constitutional
right of minority communities of Chicago to live free from state-instituted
discrimination and excessive force of police. This constitutional right of the
community has been violated for decades, perhaps centuries, by police and others. At
the opposite end of the fulcrum, the collective constitutional right of the Fraternal
Order of Police Lodge 7 (“FOP”) and its rank-and-file members of the assurance that
obligations in their collective bargaining agreement shall not be impaired by any law.
Ongoing criminal and civil litigation over these constitutional issues has simply failed
to repair the underlying fragile relationship and has, instead, made it worse,
entrenching community and police against each other and calcifying ever polarizing
positions.
“How a society deals with its past has a major determining influence on whether that
society will achieve long-term peace and stability. . . . Dealing with past injustices is
a crucial test for a new democratic order. Facing the tension between justice and
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peace, the transitional process entails tremendous challenges.” 6 These are not words
written about Chicago, but Rwanda years after a failed peace process enforced by
Western ideals resulted in a horrific genocide and subsequent traditional gacaca
peace courts that are similar in many ways to the tribal legal systems intimated by
Justice O’Connor. While the term genocide is not (yet) applicable in Chicago, the hint
of similar long-standing racial tensions is, nevertheless, palpable. That the creative
body of work from a visionary Native-American poet might be the source of fresh
meaning potentially thawing the deep misunderstandings in Chicago between police
and community is not as fanciful as it may have once seemed.
On June 19, 2019, Joy Harjo was appointed the 23rd United States Poet Laureate and
is the first Native American to occupy the role. 7 Thirty-four years ago in 1985, Harjo
published a poem entitled "The Woman Hanging from the Thirteenth Floor"
revealing a modern Chicago crisis resulting from racial discrimination and
segregation, division of communities, individual isolation, and voices from the past,
present and future who are ignored, unheard, silenced, suppressed, fragmented,
disenfranchised, terminated and forgotten. 8 Trapped in Harjo's harrowing
"Thirteenth Floor" in Chicago's east side is a young Native American woman
symbolizing a larger epidemic tragedy that has only grown deeper in Chicago, in
particular the heartbreaking relationship between the Chicago police and minority
communities.
Within Harjo’s poem, however, lies a potential solution: Voice. Harjo's poem suggests
potential healing of such crises where Native-American voices are “claim[ed] . . .
again."9 Indeed, the desperate woman of the proverbial thirteenth floor hears the
voices of her community that others have ignored: “[s]ome of them scream” and
others “cry softly from the sidewalks.”10 The approach of the Poet Laureate of this
Nation is crucial for Chicago: Only through a return to Native-American voices, in
particular the peacemaking process of reparative justice for disputes traditional in
Native American community tribunals, can the crisis of the “Thirteenth Floor” in
Chicago ever begin to heal between the police and minority communities.
Harjo has described the motivation behind her poetry as follows:
I can say what motivates me. And a sense of justice has always moivated me;
that indigenous people were the original peoples, and yet, often, we're not
present at the table or our voices are not heard. And the other thing that
motivates me utterly is the need for healing.11
Similarly, the motivation of this article is an attempt to balance the conflicting sense
of justice (and constitutional rights) between Chicago police and minority
communities through peacekeeping techniques of the indigenous, original people of
this land in an effort to bring everyone to the table so that all voices may be heard in
discovery of a lasting healing of deep, unforgiving wounds that have only festered
through ongoing adversarial litigation. The article’s structure adopts Harjo’s
motivations, accordingly: The first section recognizes the conflicting sense of justice
and constitutional rights of community and police; the second section acknowledges
the loss of voice through adversarial litigation models; and the final section brings
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the lost Native American voice of reparative justice to the table in acknowledgment
of potential healing. May Harjo’s fresh words of visionary conflict resolution take root
in Chicago at the “Thirteenth Floor.” This article is dedicated to exploring that
possibility.
II.

RECOGNIZING A CONFLICTING SENSE OF JUSTICE12
A.

The Accumulating Violations of Constitutional Rights
Against Members of Chicago’s Minority Communities

The Police Accountability Task Force of Chicago squarely hit the nail on the head
when it recognized that Chicago has a “long sad history of death, false imprisonment,
physical and verbal abuse and general discontent about police actions in
neighborhoods of color” and that “[r]acism and maltreatment at the hands of police
have been consistent complaints from communities of color for decades.”13 The
federal lawsuit resulting in the Chicago Consent Decree alleged an egregious pattern
and practice of individual constitutional violations at the hands of bad-acting police
within the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”). The consent decree summarized the
Constitutional violations set forth in the Complaint filed by Illinois Attorney General
Lisa Madigan:
CPD violates the Constitution, and state and federal laws, by engaging in a
pattern of using excessive force, including deadly force, in a manner that
disproportionately harms Chicago’s African American and Latino residents.
The Complaint sought to address allegations that CPD engages in a pattern and
practice of civil rights violations and unconstitutional policing and address
recommendations and conclusions set for by the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ Report”) and the Police Accountability Task Force convened by [former]
Mayor Rahm Emmanuel (“PATF Report”).14
Determining whether a constitutional violation by law enforcement occurred is a
lengthy, murky process and involves the ambitious intellectual balancing of the
“totality of the circumstances” under the Fourth Amendment:
The use of excessive force by a law officer violates the Fourth Amendment. “In
determining whether police used excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment, the relevant inquiry is ‘whether the officers’ actions [were]
objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.’” In
determining whether force . . . is reasonable, courts look to “the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat . . . whether he
is actively resisting . . . [and is ] “judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” An
officer’s use of force is unreasonable if, judging from the totality of the
circumstances at the time of arrest, the officer uses greater force than was
reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrest.15
The DOJ report further opined that there was a “pattern or practice” of such
constitutional violations within the CPD, which, in part, ignited the complaint and
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eventual Chicago Consent Decree.16 While courts require neither “statistical
evidence” nor a “specific number of incidents” to determine a “pattern or practice,”
the DOJ determined that a pattern or practice of unconstitutional violations of the
Fourth Amendment did and does exist within the CPD. And too often, the violations
lead to the tragic death of young black men.
Indeed, “too often” is an understatement. Alarming statistics provide the grim reality
of the crisis level. Since 2015, The Washington Post has maintained a database of
shootings in which an on-duty police officer shoots and kills a civilian.17 The Post
reported 1,004 people shot and killed by police in 2019.18 For calendar year 2018 the
Post reported 992 fatal police shootings.19 The year 2017 recorded 986,20 and 2016
saw 962.21 The comprehensive database also provides detailed information for each
killing related to the name of the victim, location, gender, race, age, weapon carried
(if any), body camera noted, whether the victim was fleeing the scene, etc.22 Of the
2019 police shooting deaths, 95 percent have been male, 70 percent non-white or race
“unknown,” and 27 percent under the age of 29.23 Another troubling statistic is
whether the victim was armed. In 2019, 41 people were killed by police who were
completely unarmed; 26 had a toy “weapon;” and 171 wielded only knives. 24 The
numbers and statistics speak for themselves. There is an ongoing dysfunction
between minority communities and police departments, including Chicago, that
result in the tragic deaths of a young black men. Between the years 2016 and 2019,
more than 4,938 human lives have been lost and communities and families forever
damaged.25 This is the definition of a crisis. Considering that there were 4,435 battle
deaths on the “American” side in the Revolutionary War, the comparison of numbers
begins to resemble something beyond a mere “crisis.” 26
The accelerating accumulation of unconstitutional violations against individuals
within minority communities by law enforcement officers—often resulting in tragic
death—tips the fulcrum to one side. For many, the balance justified a consent decree
threatening constitutional violations of the contractual rights of an entire group of
individuals, the majority of whom uphold the Constitution without blemish and at
great personal risk to their own self and family.
B.

The Collective Constitutional Right of the Police Union under
the Contracts Clause

Article I of the United States Constitution establishes what is known as the “Contracts
Clause.” Article I, Section 10, clause 1 states, in part, that “[n]o State shall . . . pass
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts
. . .”27 Likewise, the Illinois Constitution also contains a “Contracts Clause” in Article
I, Section 16, similarly stating that “[n]o ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special privileges or
immunities, shall be passed.”28 There are two contracts at issue for the FOP—its own
collective bargaining agreement with the City of Chicago, a successor contract which
is still in negotiations, and the Consent Decree entered into between the City of
Chicago and the State of Illinois from which the FOP was excluded.
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The Consent Decree is a Contract Unprotected by the
Contracts Clause of the Constitution.

While consent “decrees” sound like the province of Shakespearean kings and
emperors making sweeping declarations against their citizenry, they are not. 29 To the
contrary, consent decrees are mere contracts. However, unlike the FOP collective
bargaining agreement, the Chicago Consent Decree does not enjoy the protection of
the Contracts Clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Admittedly,
consent decrees do have elements of both a contract, itself, and a State action
enforcing a law, and courts have recognized this dual characterization of consent
decrees as such: “[C]onsent decrees ‘have attributes both of contracts and of judicial
decrees’; a dual character that has resulted in different treatment for different
purposes.’”30 However, in 1961, the United States Supreme Court held in System
Federation No. 91 Railway Employees’ Department v. Wright that a previously
entered consent decree, regardless of its “contract” attributes, may be altered by
subsequent legislation without triggering a constitutional contracts clause analysis. 31
The purpose behind such a holding is that the “[c]ourt’s authority to adopt a consent
decree comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce” 32 and
“[a] state is without power to enter into binding contracts not to exercise its police
power in the future.”33 That is, the State cannot enter into a consent decree contract
purportedly enforcing the terms of a statute by agreeing that the legislature cannot
later amend the same statute.
The authority of Judge Robert M. Dow Jr. of the Northern District of Illinois to adopt
the Chicago Consent Decree entered into between the City of Chicago and the State
of Illinois comes from the statutes that the consent decree is intended to enforce: the
Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003,34 and the Illinois Human Rights Act.35 According to
Supreme Court precedent, the consent decree is not a binding contract that is
protected from amendments via subsequent legislation or ordinance. This is in stark
contrast, however, to the FOP collective bargaining agreement, which cannot be
amended by legislation or ordinance without a careful and tedious balancing analysis
under the afore-referenced Contracts Clause of the United States and Illinois
Constitutions.
2.

The FOP Collective Bargaining Agreement is a Contract
Protected by The Contracts Clause of The Constitution
and Cannot Be Unilaterally Altered by the Chicago
Consent Decree.

Unlike a consent decree, the FOP collective bargaining agreement enjoys the
constitutional protection of the Contracts Clause. Since January 2019, the City of
Chicago and its Police Department have been operating under a consent decree
entered into between the City and the State of Illinois. Curiously absent from the
consent decree, however, is the sole and exclusive representative of rank-and-file
police officers, the Fraternal Order of Police. Typically, when determining whether a
state enactment unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of contracts, courts apply
a three-prong test:
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First, has the state law in fact substantially impaired a contractual
relationship? Second, if the law constitutes a substantial impairment, can the
state show a legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, 'such as the
remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem'? Third, is the
legitimate public purpose sufficient to justify the impairment of the contractual
rights.36
Here, there is a contract (the collective bargaining agreement) and a consent decree
that is not a “State enactment” for contracts clause analysis, but rather a mere
contract that not only does not have the constitutional protection of the Contracts
Clause, but also does not contain the voice of a key affected third party: the collective
voice of the FOP. Even though it denied the FOP’s intervention in the consent decree
case between Illinois and Chicago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals conceded that
“consent decrees ‘may not alter collective bargaining agreements without the union’s
assent.’”37 The Court further emphasized that “[i]n other words, because ‘[c]onsent
decrees are fundamentally contracts,’ the parties to those decrees ‘may not impose
duties or obligations on a third party, without that party’s agreement.’”38 There must
be consensus.
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit cited People Who Care v. Rockford Board of
Education School District No. 205.39 There, the court found that the Rockford School
District and a plaintiff class of parents inappropriately entered into a consent decree
that changed the teachers’ collective bargaining agreement in several ways, including
its seniority provisions, without the agreement (or “consent”) of the affected teachers
union.40 The court made clear that “the source of authority to require [] parties to act
remains their acquiescence . . .”41 The FOP did not agree to the Chicago Consent
Decree and, therefore, the decree cannot unilaterally change its terms or conditions
of the collective bargaining agreement without the FOP’s acquiescence.
In People Who Care, the court also recognized, however, that there are times when
“[r]emedies for violations of the Constitution may include altering statutory or
contractual rules . . . ”42 However, the court warned that forced “consent” via court
intervention/order would be extreme and would require some demonstration that a
constitutional violation did, in fact, occur, and that the contractual change directly
remedies the violation. The Court explained the tension as follows: “[c]hanging . . .
contractual rights would make the remedial job easier, but this does not license a
court to impose these changes on persons who have done no wrong.” 43 In the recent
history of the FOP, because certain individuals (e.g., Jason Van Dyke) and allegedly
groups of individuals (e.g., David March; Joseph Walsh; Thomas Gaffney, all later
acquitted) within the department have violated the constitutional rights of
Chicagoans in minority communities, it may yet be a license for a court to order
changes to a collective bargaining agreement that affects those officers who have done
no wrong.
In Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. Cleveland, a consent
decree was entered by a court involving the City of Cleveland and its fire department
after lengthy Title VII civil rights and Section 1983 litigation related to race
discrimination within the department.44 Much like the current iteration of the
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Chicago consent decree, the Cleveland consent decree first excluded the Cleveland
firefighter union even though the terms of the agreement directly affected the
promotional processes within the bargaining unit.45 Unlike Chicago, however, the
Cleveland firefighter union was able to intervene in the litigation in an attempt to be
heard by the court.46 Like the FOP, in Cleveland, “the Union protested the fact that it
had not been included in the negotiations” of the terms of the consent decree.47
The presiding district court judge in the Cleveland matter agreed with the union’s
fundamental objection that its voice had not been included in a decree that would
potentially affect the working conditions of all of its members. The union’s objection
particularly troubled the District Judge. Indeed, although hearing evidence presented
by the Vanguards [class plaintiffs] and the City in support of the decree, the Judge
stated that he was “appalled that these negotiations leading to this consent decree
did not include the intervenors [the Union and its members] . . .” and refused to pass
on the decree under the circumstances. Instead, he concluded: “I am going to at this
time to defer this proceeding until another day and I am mandating the City and the
[plaintiffs] to engage the Fire Fighters in discussions, in dialogue. Let them know
what is going on, hear their particular problems.”48
In Cleveland, the judge’s mandate to Cleveland and the plaintiffs was taken seriously.
Subsequently, “[c]ounsel for all three parties participated in 40 hours of intensive
[collective] negotiations . . . and [all] agreed to a revised consent decree . . .” 49 In
Chicago, however, the court refused to allow the FOP to intervene on a timeliness
technicality and, accordingly, the FOP and its membership were shut out of
discussion, allowed no input into the terms of the decree, and, effectively, were not
“heard” during the negotiations of an agreement between the State and City that
could void, or at the very least, impair, terms of a collective bargaining agreement
related to the collective working conditions of the rank-and-file in possible violation
of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions.
III.

RECOGNIZING LOST VOICE IN ADVERSARIAL LITIGATION
MODELS50

In a summer townhall meeting in South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg fielded
questions from an injured, angry, and frustrated African-American community
outraged by a police shooting leading to the death of a young black man. 51 Resident
Verma Blackman had many questions for Mayor Buttigieg and told him that “her
young grandson was scared of his city’s police officers. . . . I wanted him to respond
to our cries. Because we are crying”52 Ms. Blackman’s comments eerily mirror Joy
Harjo’s “Thirteenth Floor” were voices “scream” and “cry softly from the sidewalks”
in Chicago.53 Recent efforts of the Chicago Civilian Office of Police Accountability
(COPA) and Lori Lightfoot in her work prior to assuming the office of Mayor, sought
to remedy this failure by engaging the community in addressing the deep injuries
sustained by the community at the hands of some within the Chicago Police
Department. During the process, however, the voices of those in the Chicago Police
Department, itself, were isolated from the community. Although the commission did
randomly select a group of CPD officers and asked a certain set of questions, these
officers were separated and isolated away from the community such that the two
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parties could not see each other, address each other, hear and listen to each other
and come to their own consensus related to healing a relationship. 54
The lack of voice (to be heard) and inability to speak is the ongoing struggle and
complaint in the relationship between the Chicago Police Department and minority
communities in the City. When the situation involves police gun fire and a subsequent
death of a young black man, the loss of voice is a refrain repeated by the lost victims,
families who remain, communities forever changed, and even the accused police
officer(s). It is the struggle that, to date, has not been adequately addressed through
the justice system of courtroom litigation and, thus, cannot heal.
A.

The Lost Voice of Chicago Minority Communities Through
Inadequate Litigation Models

When tragic death occurs at the hands of law enforcement, two paths of litigation
genereally follow: (1) criminal prosecution determined by an elected or appointed
attorney general; and/or (2) civil litigation under Section 1983 for violations of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On October 5, 2018, a jury convicted Jason Van
Dyke of second-degree murder for killing Laquan McDonald, an unarmed black male
teen in Chicago in October 2014.55 In January 2019, he was sentenced to almost seven
years in prison.56 Few, if any, on any side were satisfied with this outcome. At the
sentencing hearing, Laquan McDonald’s great uncle, Marvin Hunter, poignantly
summoned Laquan’s spirt when reading a victim-impact statement and, at the same
time, invoked the key flaw in a justice system centered on courtroom litigation—the
lack of voice: “. . . ‘I am unable to speak with my own voice . . .’” observed both Mr.
Hunter and Mr. McDonald, posthumously.57 The main failure of the adversarial
justice model is its failure to allow room for voice.
For parents and families of victims of police violence who have seen a Section 1983
lawsuit to conclusion (e.g., the family of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri), the
litigation was likely an expression of voice and “[g]iving the Brown parents some
agency . . . what Michael Brown’s mother, Lesley McSpadden, sought was to
reestablish after her son’s death was a sense of control.”58 Yet, even where
“successful,” a Section 1983 lawsuit also stifles the voices of victim and accused
through the rules of civil procedure. For the very few cases that do reach trial, the
rules regulating speech in a courtroom are numerous and range from restrictive rules
of evidence, to lawyers framing testimony and evidence through witness examination
and objections, to judges ruling on those objections, and to carefully crafted and
limited jury instructions. Indeed, the defendants in the overwhelming majority of
criminal trials never take the witness stand or speak one word of their truth.59
Citing a Harvard Law Review article by Myriam Gilles in 1977, Professor Katherine
Macfarlane concurs with the assessment that Section 1983 is “a statute intended to
solve large problems. . . to combat the widespread practices of local officials . . . [and]
to bring about ‘major changes in the structure of relationships among citizens, states,
and federal government.’”60 Yet, as Section 1983 lawsuits challenging excessive
police force have slowly slogged through court systems over the decades, more recent
civil rights scholars have noted the inefficiencies of the statute to actually “solve large
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problems.” Macfarlane of the recently noted the words of Anthony Scott, brother of
Walter Scott, who was shot by a Charleston, South Carolina, police officer, that
“nothing can replace having Walter in our lives..” 61 Macfarlane also posited that
during the slow process of criminal justice and Section 1983 civil lawsuits where a
young person of color has died through excessive police force, “[t]he victims’ families
are frustrated” and “[c]rowds of protesters around the country shared their
frustration.”62 While large settlements of such matters sometimes provide monetary
relief, the wounds of the family, the community involved, and the even the larger
community of the relationship between citizens and police remain deep and
damaging. As such, Macfarlane acknowledged that the “[pre-]litigation settlement
strategy employed by the families is not the kind of strategy that brings about societal
or even widespread change.”63
And while a full-throated “impact” litigation of a Section 1983 lawsuit is, in fact,
designed to spur societal change through a finding of liability and various types of
injunctive relief ( for example, a consent decree aimed at a police department),
Macfarlane recognized that “[i]n general, excessive force precedent is not friendly to
Section 1983 plaintiffs.”64 The plaintiffs’ voices and expectations of the Section 1983
litigation often get lost where the aim of the lawsuit itself for “systemic reform that
[does] not necessarily benefit the specific plaintiff(s).” 65 It must be remembered that
at least a third of any settlement of a Section 1983 case (or pre-litigation settlement)
will be shared with the attorneys representing the victim’s families and includes a nofault liability clause, which certainly is not the definition of “justice” for any parent
who lost a child to police violence. 66 Instead, it subverts pain and voice into a cold
monetary amount.
These restrictions on free speech of voice when attempting to adjust and resolve deep,
ongoing, longstanding harms and injuries within a community like Chicago offend
not only the First Amendment right to free speech, but the human condition of innate
fairness and justice. In a recent symposium panel discussion held at Northwestern
University School of Law on the expanding concept of "justice," Cook County Circuit
Court Judge Sophia Hall explained the justice concept of being heard as follows:
As a child, I thought it was easy. I knew what justice was. Listen to me. Hear
what I have to say.... Restorative justice goes to the fairness I felt as a child:
knowing how important it was to be listened to, to be respected, to be heardto have my side of the story not only heard, but responded to.67
If the definition of justice is that voice(s) are heard, the adversarial litigation system
routinely fails—particularly minority communities facing regular use of deadly police
force.
B.

The Lost Voice of Chicago Police Through Inadequate
Litigation Models
1.

The popular
enforcement

appeal

to

silence

the

voice

of

law
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On January 2, 2019, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied the efforts of the
Chicago Fraternal Order of Police to intervene in the Section 1983 litigation which
resulted in the current Chicago Consent Decree, finding that the FOP’s efforts were
“untimely” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2).68 A motion to intervene
in the litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 is for all intents and
purposes, a request that the court hear voices of third parties not yet named in the
litigation. At the oral argument before the court, the FOP outlined the numerous ways
the consent decree negotiations excluded and silenced the voice of the FOP:
The FOP did not know despite several assurances from the State that its
collective bargaining agreement would not be affected. When the FOP first
learned that the State was seeking to change provisions . . . it filed a motion to
intervene . . . They locked us out of that meeting. We did not know what they
were planning on doing. . . . They locked us out, Your Honor. We were never
involved in any of those interventions. . . .69
The phrase “locked out” in the labor union context conjures images of employers
shutting the door and refusing to listen any further to the voice of the union or
employees. Instead, discussions effectively end, and the only resolution is accepting
contract terms voiced by the employer. The Seventh Circuit denied the FOP’s
intervening voice and dismissed the motion on procedural timeliness. 70
Some legal scholarship surrounding police abuse/violence and excessive/deadly
force against minority communities focuses primarily on suspending or removing
voice of entire groups of rank-and-file police. For example, Catherine Fisk and L.
Song Richardson suggest the following solutions: (1) undermining the democratic
voice of the majority with minority groups; and (2) removing certain securities of
ordinary “just cause” for police discipline (a long-standing cornerstone of ordinary
due process and justice in any unionized workforce).71 The article “highlights the
contractual and statutory protections” of police unions and posits that these deeply
ingrained rights “pose the most significant obstacles to reforms.” 72 Similarly, in his
article “Police Union Contracts,” Stephen Rushin hypothesizes that police voice visà-vis collective bargaining agreements “may” or “can” lead to the serious
constitutional violations of individuals.73 Although recognizing that police officers
should have adequate due process protections during internal investigations,74
Rushin suggests resolution by narrowing subjects of bargaining, criticizing provisions
of the Chicago collective bargaining agreement sunsetting discipline, delaying
interrogations and precluding anonymous complaints. 75 He also critiques Law
Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, including the Illinois statute that, he maintains,
precludes anonymous complaints by requiring that citizen complaints be supported
by sworn affidavits.76 Other legal scholars champion the use of zealous litigation
against law enforcement through tort law, contract law, Section 1983 lawsuits, and
attempts to invalidate contracts through litigation as the means to justify the ends of
needed police reform.77 In doing so, long-held contractual provisions voicing the
constitutional rights of police officers are reframed as “interrogation buffers” and
“delay privilege” instead of ordinary industrial due process.78
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As noted by the Seventh Circuit, using a consent decree and other litigious means to
strip voice from an entire group and “[c]hanging . . . contractual rights would make
the remedial job easier” if it were Constitutional.79 Even if the measure to remove the
collective bargaining voice from the FOP and its members were constitutional, it is a
mere topical ointment, a litigious band-aid, not fully addressing the underlying
difficulties in the relationship. Nevertheless, regardless of the popular calls to
significantly alter collective bargaining rights through State action or a Consent
Decree, as previously demonstrated, the FOP collective bargaining agreement enjoys
the protection of the Contracts Clause under the Constitution.80 Accordingly, the only
current means to change the terms of the collective bargaining agreement is through
contract negotiations and inevitable interest arbitration. Unfortunately, like the
band-aid of the Consent Decree, interest arbitration also does not fully address the
underlying difficulties in the relationship.
2.

Inevitable lost voice of law enforcement through interest
arbitration

In the November 2019 FOP Lodge 7 Newsletter, President Kevin Graham observed
an inevitable truth: “It is time for the City to get our contract done or go to
arbitration.”81 Although the collective bargaining agreement with the FOP, covering
rank-and-file Chicago police officers, expired June 30, 2017, 82 terms and conditions
of the expired contract continue in full force and effect during negotiations under the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act and the prior agreement, itself.83
Paragraphs 710 and 711 of the 721 paragraphs of the Chicago Consent Decree speak
volumes of the spirit of these negotiations.84 In them, the parties to the Consent
Decree (of which the FOP is not one) acknowledge that Chicago has four collective
bargaining agreements with various labor unions including the FOP and that the City
is currently in contract negotiations with said unions. 85 Both paragraphs also make
reference to impasse procedures in Section 14 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act and Section 28.3 of the current collective bargaining agreements. 86 There is no
doubt that Chicago anticipates contract negotiations moving to interest arbitration.
The prior two contracts (2007-2012 and 2012-2017) also involved years of
negotiations before a successor agreement was reached through the dispute
resolution method of interest arbitration.87
The consent decree seeks fundamental changes to the FOP collective bargaining
agreement, including but not limited to affidavit requirements, a prohibition on
anonymous complaints, and substantial changes to the retention timeline for
disciplinary records in employment files and subsequent discipline.88 Furthermore,
the Consent Decree also attempts to give guidance to the impasse process in
suggesting how it should be interpreted during that process: “Nothing in this Consent
Decree shall be interpreted as obligating the City or the Union to violate (i) the terms
of the CBAs, including any Successor CBAs resulting from the negotiation process . .
. unless such terms violate the U.S. Constitution, Illinois law or public policy.”89
Moreover, the City is directed pursuant to paragraph 711 of the Consent Decree that
it “shall use its best efforts to secure modifications to the CBAs consistent with the
terms of this Consent Decree . . .”90
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The current contract negotiations between City and Police will conclude in interest
arbitration over outstanding matters contemplated in the Chicago Consent Decree.
Reasonable minds may then differ over whether issues in the consent decree are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Accordingly, either the parties will need to agree
that the issues are mandatory subjects to be determined by the arbitrator or the
Illinois Labor Relations Board will need to decide the issue in the first instance before
submitting to the arbitrator.91 The Board specifically ruled to hold the cases
determining whether body cameras and the CR Matrix system are mandatory
subjects in abeyance pending the status of the consent decree and the parties’ contract
negotiations.92 Like many involved in the bargaining process between City and the
FOP, the Board “hopes that the parties would resolve the matter themselves in
keeping with the spirit of the Act and hope the parties will likewise be able to resolve
[it] . . . through their negotiations of a successor agreement.” 93
If the parties agree they are mandatory and ripe for a decision from the arbitrator,
the question then becomes whether they are economic or non-economic matters.
Most contractual changes contemplated under the consent decree are non-economic,
and thus would be subject to a traditional arbitration award, meaning, that the
arbitrator may fashion a unique award on each issue and does not have to fully adopt
either party’s last proposal.94
City Exhibit One at hearing will likely be the Chicago Consent Decree and all
supporting reports—all alleging that policing in the City of Chicago is broken due to
a pattern and practice of violations of Constitutional rights of the minority citizens in
the City. The last two interest arbitration awards involving FOP collective bargaining
agreements stated the standard for changing current contract language through
interest arbitration as follows: “[t]he burden for changing an existing benefit rests
with the party seeking the change ... [and] ... in order for me to impose a change, the
burden is on the party seeking the change to demonstrate that the existing system is
broken.”95 It would hardly be a stretch that an arbitrator would agree that the policing
system is broken, but whether the existing system of the collective bargaining
agreement is the broken element in need of change is the unanswered question before
an arbitrator. And it is the City’s burden to prove.
Regardless of outcome, anything less than the consent decree, verbatim, will not be
acceptable to the City and community activists who feel the consent decree does not
go far enough. The City will certainly argue that the “public policy” language of the
consent decree implies that anything less would contravene the detailed “public
policy” outlined in the consent decree, itself. However, a consent decree, according to
the Supreme Court of the United States, is not necessarily “public policy” under the
law.
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of United Rubber, the
Supreme Court articulated the well-known premise that “[a]s with any contract . . . a
court may not enforce a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public
policy.”96 Yet, the Court continued that
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Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained “by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.” It is beyond question that
obedience to judicial orders is an important public policy. . . . Voluntary
compliance with Title VII also is an important public policy. 97
Although the narrow holding in Grace involved a grievance arbitration award, not
interest arbitration, the underlying rule of law related to the analysis of a public policy
argument may apply here. The Chicago Consent Decree is an agreement between the
City of Chicago and the State of Illinois to resolve alleged civil rights violations under
the Constitution and Illinois Civil Rights and Human Rights Acts. 98 There is no trial
or judicial determination of the allegations. Instead, the district court entered a
settlement agreement (consent decree). And (similar to some of the facts in Grace),
“the conciliation [consent decree] process did not include the Union” 99 despite the
Union’s best efforts to intervene in the Chicago situation. The Court recognized in
Grace that “[a]bsent a judicial determination, the Commission, not to mention the
Company, cannot alter the collective bargaining agreement without the Union’s
consent.”100 Accordingly, a “conciliation agreement” [consent decree] entered into
without the Union is not the definition of “public policy.” 101
With the reference to “public policy” in paragraph 711, the Consent Decree opens the
door for the argument to an interest arbitrator that any agreement not fully
incorporating the requirements of the Consent Decree would be against “public
policy.”
Yet, as recognized by the Seventh Circuit, “parties can’t accomplish through a consent
decree something they lack the ability to do by contract.” 102 Accordingly, an arbitrator
may entirely ignore a consent decree. For example, in a case arising out of Rhode
Island and involving coat of living adjustment (COLA) increases in the 1990s, the
court acknowledged that an arbitrator did not, necessarily, have to abide by the
constraints of a consent decree.103 The court explained that “the 1991 consent decree
would not indefinitely inhibit . . . an interest arbitration panel from modifying the
COLA prospectively.”104 Further, in response to questions of the arbitrator’s authority
where there is a consent decree involving the same issues before the interest
arbitrator, the court stated that “interest arbitrators for the parties can do anything
that the parties could have agreed to do.” 105 The Chicago Consent Decree states that
certain recommendations will be subject to “best efforts to renegotiate collective
bargaining provisions.”106 Presumably, then, the arbitrator tapped to settle the 2017
Chicago FOP collective bargaining agreement is not bound to the terms of the consent
decree and may fashion any award for the submitted issues subject only to statutory
restrictions.
Ultimately, however, whether the City or City Council will approve anything less than
the full language of the Consent Decree from an interest arbitrator is uncharted
territory. The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act acknowledges that the public
employer’s governing body may reject any interest arbitration award. 107 The FOP
contract similarly states:
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9.
If the City Council should reject the arbitrated agreement, the parties
shall meet again within ten (10) days of the Council’s vote to discuss the
reasons for the Council’s rejection and to determine whether any modifications
can be made to deal with the problems; but either party may thereafter
terminated this Agreement upon ten (10) days’ written notice to the other.
10.
There shall be no implementation of any provisions of a successor
agreement without Council ratification and adoption in ordinance form of the
agreement; except, however, that the terms of this Agreement shall remain in
full force and effective until a successor agreement is adopted in ordinance
form or this Agreement is terminated pursuant to subparagraph 28.3(B)(9). 108
While true as previously stated that “parties can’t accomplish through a consent
decree something they lack the ability to do by contract” 109 and an arbitrator can craft
an award related to non-economic mandatory subjects of bargaining that is less than
the Chicago Consent Decree, if the Chicago City Council rejects the award, neither the
voice of the City nor that of the police rank-and-file are served, stalemate ensues, and
positions harden. In this unique consent decree situation, the interest arbitration
dispute resolution model—the only model currently recognized by law, contract, and
mutual consensus of the parties—is simply inadequate for the deep underlying issues
at stake.
IV. NATIVE AMERICAN REPARATIVE JUSTICE AS A BRAVE NEW
MODEL OF HEALING IN CHICAGO 110
As previously acknowledged, a Section 1983 lawsuit is, theoretically, designed to spur
societal change through a finding of liability and various injunctive relief. 111 Yet the
1983 lawsuit brought by the State of Illinois against the City of Chicago for an alleged
pattern and practice of constitutional violations within the CPD has, thus far, resulted
in a consent decree that the Monitoring Team and the Illinois Attorney General have
determined is not being met due to significant implementation challenges. 112 This
frustrating failure of the lawsuit and resulting consent decree is not the fault of any
party or stakeholder involved. Rather, the failure stems from the adversarial litigation
model itself, which is solely focused on determining who is “right” and who is
“wrong,” and acts as an authority figure who orders others into action.
However, healing such long-standing injuries must come from within. The Police
Accountability Task Force astutely identified some of the sources of the deep harms
between police and community in its Recommendation for Reform:
The linkage between racism and CPD did not just bubble up in the aftermath
of the release of the McDonald video. Racism and maltreatment at the hands
of the police have been consistent complaints from communities of color for
decades. And there have been many significant flashpoints over the years—the
killing of Fred Hampton (1960s), the Metcalfe hearings (1970s), federal court
findings of a pattern and practice of discriminatory hiring (1970s), Jon Burge
and his midnight crew (1970s to 1990s), widespread disorderly conduct arrests
(1980s), the unconstitutional gang loitering ordinance (1990s), widespread
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use of investigatory stops and frisks (2000s) and other points. False arrests,
coerced confessions and wrongful convictions are also a part of this history.
Lives lost and countless more damaged. These events and others mark a long,
sad history of death, false imprisonment, physical and verbal abuse and
general discontent about police actions in neighborhoods of color.113
This documented long, sad history certainly predates the 1960s to slavery, the
founding of this country, and the brutal and forcible removal of the Native peoples of
this land. It is no wonder that an adversarial legal system brought from Europe and
violently implemented would fail to resolve the deep wounds that colonization
initiated. The words from an African studies scholar on the Rwandan genocide again
ring true here in Chicago:
Truth is knowing about and officially acknowledging past human rights abuse. This
official acknowledgment can open a dialogue in the state between individuals, and
the various groups in the society. Facilitating an open and honest dialogue can effect
a catharsis and prevents collective amnesia which is not only unhealthy for the body
politic, but also essentially an illusion—an unresolved past inevitably returns to haunt
a society in transition.114
Returning the Native American voice, in particular the Native American reparative
justice model, to the crisis between Chicago police and minority communities
acknowledges voice, past human rights abuses, and can facilitate and actually
effectuate an honest catharsis, unlike the results, thus far, of the adversarial, colonialbased litigation models.
A.

Origins of the Adversarial Litigation Model’s Inability to Heal
Deep Injuries

The adversarial judicial model of the United States is not native to this soil. In her
article “Returning to the Circle: The Reemergence of Traditional Dispute Resolution
in Native American Communities,” Jessica Metoui explains the colonial imposition
of a Western justice system as hierarchal and foreign to the original people of this
continent as follows:
The pervasive view of equality in the Native American conception of
government and dispute resolution was particularly foreign to the white
colonists who worked hard to impose systems of hierarchy into tribal societies.
An example of the White efforts to squelch the traditional Indian framework of
equality lies in the settlers’ “solution” for the status of women in Native
American society. In most traditional Native American societies, women
played a central role in governmental decisions. . . . Settlers who encountered
Native American gender roles in practice viewed their own Europeanized,
hierarchal society as superior to these Indian notions of equality. . . . The
United States government . . . also sought to impose Western ideals of justice
on Native American tribes. The U.S. government carried out this goal by
instituting adversarial legal systems . . .115
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The American justice system is hierarchal in that a select few preside over disputes
and issue the labels of "right" and "wrong" based upon a confined set of facts involving
one particular incident. Michigan Judge Timothy Connors, who presided as a judge
on Native American peacemaking courts, has described the inadequacies of our
current a hierarchy of justice system:
Current state court justice systems are structured around "either-or" decision
making. The adversarial system looks at problems through the narrow lens of
X vs. Y, guilty or not guilty. An individual or relationship is then judged and
labeled solely by a single event. The label replaces the person, and we are
prevented from solving the whole problem and all that underlies it. Current
systems create division within the community. When we label an individual,
we separate and isolate him from the community. He is no longer a colleague,
neighbor, or community member, but a juvenile delinquent, felon, offender,
neglectful parent, or abusive spouse. The justice system sets him aside and the
community will continue to exclude, divide, and separate itself from the
person. Labeling and dividing continue the cycle of wrongdoing. . . . we've
resolved and restored nothing, the individual eventually accepts the label as
truth and continues living accordingly. This leads to recidivism, polarization,
and harmful relationships that tear the fabric of family and community . . . 116
Now consider the long, sad Chicago history of police abuse of power against Chicago's
minority communities through the lens set forth by Judge Connors:
The [Chicago police are] then judged and labeled solely by a single event [or
group of events]. The label replaces the [Chicago police], and we are prevented
from solving the whole problem and all that underlies it. Current systems
create division within the community. When we label the [Chicago police], we
separate and isolate it from the community. [Chicago police are] no longer a
colleague, neighbor, or community member, but a [racist and secretive
brotherhood]. The justice system sets [Chicago police] aside and the
community will continue to exclude, divide, and separate itself from the
[Chicago police] . . . we've resolved and restored nothing, the [Chicago police]
eventually accept[] the label as truth and continue[] living accordingly. This
leads to recidivism, polarization, and harmful relationships that tear the fabric
of family and community. . . 117
The adversarial system is not designed to heal deeply dysfunctional relationships that
span generations, regardless of who the accused or victims are. Instead, it deepens
divides, separates communities, and zealously argues the positions of one side over
the other, resulting only in the festering of old wounds.
Other scholars of Native American reparative justice traditions have explained the
difference between the Native American system and the colonial American imposed
justice systems as one of equality within an entire community:
Judges in an adversarial system have the power to determine the outcome of
conflict, a decision that results in a win-loss situation for the parties. . . by
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contract, [Native American justice systems] distributes power equally without
regard to hierarchy. . . . participants within a conflict, whether direct or
indirect, form equally important links in the chain of conflict resolution. . . .
liken[ed] . . . to a circle . . . [where] there is no right or left, nor is there a
beginning or an end . . .118
In the Native American systems, strict dichotomies of right and wrong transform into
a system of equal voices without diminishing access to power. In stark contrast, the
adversarial justice (both criminal and civil) systems imposed by the foreign European
model
choos[e] instead to focus on the perceived superiority of the adversarial system
as the ‘right’ conception of justice and the law. . . . Western style courts . . .
[and] the adversarial systems [were] imposed by the United States’
colonization efforts . . .119
While the American adversarial justice system focuses on punishing the individual
wrongdoer as a remedy for the victim(s), the Native American peacemaking approach
is much more community centered, which is the repeated appeal of minority
communities in Chicago—community involvement in resolution of disputes with and
crimes of police. That said, scholars of Native American studies have noted that
“[c]onsistent with this holistic, inclusive perception of the universe, many Native
American communities view crime as a problem which cannot be resolved on a purely
individual level.”120 The American criminal justice system, instead,
“overwhelming[ly] . . . focuses on individual punishment of the wrongdoer without
inclusion of the community as a whole.”121
It is no surprise that imposing a foreign adversarial litigation model upon a situation
beginning before the founding of this nation does nothing but create an ongoing cycle
of damage. Native American scholars observe the ongoing damage caused by a
Western adversarial legal system when attempting to address deep trauma sustained
in minority communities as follows:
[P]articipation in an adversarial trial of the offender poses the risk of inflicting
further emotional trauma to the victim. This risk of further trauma to the
victim stems in part from the trial’s focus on the wrongdoer, while the victim’s
role is very limited. She is allowed to testify against her offender as a trial
witness and, later, may give a victim impact statement at the sentencing
hearing. While the resulting punishment may benefit some victims, the
adversarial court process as a whole provides no meaningful opportunity for
healing. Additionally, the victim’s lack of control over the process may result
in a further loss of empowerment and feeling of revictimization.122
Consider now a situation where the wrongdoer is a police officer, and the victim a
young black man. In the unusual case, the adversarial process may eventually lead to
a conviction and modest prison sentence for the accused police officer, but,
nevertheless, leaves the victim(s) powerless, unheard and with no sense of control
over the process and with no meaningful opportunity to heal. Indeed, after over four
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years of vigorous litigation, Jason Van Dyke was sentenced to almost seven years in
prison for the murder of Laquan McDonald. The litigation results of a conviction and
prison sentence of the former Chicago police officer did not heal the family, the
community, or the relationship between the Chicago Police Department and
Chicago’s minority communities. In fact, “[t]he slaying of Laquan McDonald that has
riled the city for years ended with a prison sentence . . . that only deepened the rifts”123
between police and the community they are obligated to serve and protect.
B.

The Overwhelming Call for an Alternative System of Dispute
Resolution

Community advocates clamor for real change in the current justice system and
relationship with police in Chicago. On June 26, 2019, community advocate Gabriel
Montero commented on the need for “a transformative solution to the most troubling
question at the heart of a city ripped apart by police misconduct.”124 Others in
Chicago acknowledge that "the existing system is rotted, it's not serving us, let's get
rid of all existing bureaucracy and let's bring in . . . community control.” 125 Yet simply
replacing a colonial hierarchal justice system with another justice system of hierarchy
seeking to strip voice from one group within the community (the police) and hand it
over to the opposing party cannot serve as a long-term solution. It would be too easy.
Michael Seng, co-director of the John Marshall Law School Restorative Justice
Project at the University of Illinois-Chicago suggests “restorative justice” as a way of
ameliorating the deeply damaged relationships between the police and minority
communities in Chicago:
What is needed [in Chicago] is restorative justice, which involves a discussion
between the officer or the department, the victim or the victim’s survivors, and
the people in the community who live with the problem and who will have to
live with the solution. In a real sense, all three parties were instrumental in
creating the problem and are essential to its solution.126
The form of the “discussion” remains open, yet Seng’s comments allude to Native
American reparative justice. , In the introduction of Navajo Nation Peacemaking:
Living Traditional Justice, Marianne Nielsen and James Zion quote former United
States Attorney General Janet Reno as another surprising source of direction on such
matters. In remarks to the to the Department of the Navy in 1999 she resurrected the
words of Abraham Lincoln and articulated what may be the solution for the present
day Chicago crisis:
About 150 years ago, Abraham Lincoln said: Discourage litigation. Persuade
your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the
nominal winner is often a real loser—in fees, expenses and wasted time . . .
Even earlier than Lincoln, Indians of the Navajo Nation created a peacemaking
system to dispense justice, using a simple form of dispute resolution that
focused . . . on problem-solving rather than winning and losing. I agree
wholeheartedly with the commentator who said the Navajo goal in dispute
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resolution of preserving the community and seeking peace is one our own
system of justice must embrace.127
The citizens of Chicago agree. In focus group discussions with Chicago community
members during the investigations of the Chicago Police Department, “[p]articipants
referenced the concept of restorative justice in a majority of the roundtables.” 128 Like
Native American reparative justice, the Chicago community is fundamentally
interested in “restoring justice to the individual . . . [and the] community harmed . . .
rather than solely focusing on punishing offenders.” 129 Chicago citizens asked and
recommended the following: peace circles with Chicago Police Department and
community members; “something more collaborative” than courts; “[r]estorative
justice” rather than “criminal justice system practices;” peace circles; restorative
justice circles; a “truth and reconciliation process for Chicago;” acknowledgement
that “we’re all people; no saints and no devils; and, learning from history130 Yet,
despite this astute recommendation from the Chicago community as a real, nonlitigious means to address the deep harms within the community when violence
occurs at the hands of those obligated to serve and protect, there has been little effort
to use the process of actual reparative justice peace circles in Chicago.
C.

Native American Reparative Justice as a Model for Healing
in Chicago
1.

Form and function of Native American Peace Circles

A return to more native reparative justice systems in the wake of generational
racial devastation and even genocidal atrocities has been used with some success
in other countries. For example, before the horrific genocide that began in 1994,
the international community and the Rwandan government engaged in “peace
negotiations” with rebel factions. Those negotiations, based upon foreign
Western models, ostensibly led to the Arusha accords. 131 However, the
“Westernized” Arusha accords were never implemented and genocide ensued. 132
Afterwards, Rwanda faced its own crisis of “[h]ow [it as] a society deals with its
past . . . [and] whether [it] will achieve long-term peace and stability.” 133 At that
time, instead of traditional adversarial Western litigation norms, Rwanda began
the journey of healing its deep, generational wounds by incorporating more
traditional reparative justice methods of the gacaca peace courts into its broader
judicial system. Similar to the Native American peace circles, discussed below,
[t]raditionally the gacaca had a dispute resolution focus. The name is
derived from the word for “lawn,” referring to the fact that members of the
gacaca sit on the grass when listening to and considering matters before
them. The process involves the community in dispute resolution, making it
community-based. It acts as a local healing and dispute resolution
mechanism that is cheap and accessible . . . It is established upon principles
of morality and reverence of life.134
Likewise, the Native American “Peacemaking is not a court process.” 135 Rather, it
centers on the “healing concept” of justice: “[P]eople replace coercive decision
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such as punishment [a purpose of western criminal justice] to correct behavior. .
. . Peacemaking is based on healing the mind, body, and spirit to end conflict
[restoration] rather than continue conflict by the use of power, force, and
punishment [United States penal system].”136 Native American Peacemaking is
also significantly different from our familiar Western-style alternative dispute
resolution processes:
Peacemaking is not to be confused with the adjudicatory processes,
mediation or arbitration. Such processes employ the adversarial system of
dispute resolution in a court setting . . . rules are employed which are
designed to compel participation in, limit participation to a select few,
confine consideration of a dispute to narrow issues, and impose often
disharmonious decisions. . . . peacemaking is the complete opposite.” 137
While there are many examples of Native American peacekeeping, the Navajo
Nation’s work with resurrecting the alternative dispute resolution method of
peacekeeping has been well documented to date. 138 “[T]here are lessons in Navajo
peacemaking for those who want to approach old problems in sensible new ways,”
according to the Honorable Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice Emeritus of the Navajo
Nation.139 As previously established, Chicago has an “old problem” of race
discrimination and violence with roots in slavery and has been present in this country
since before its founding. Believing that the courtroom drama of litigation controlled
by highly compensated lawyers, politically appointed or elected judges, a jury of
carefully selected “peers,” and rules of the court and of evidence that narrowly control
the voice, narrative and story is the real fiction. Instead,
Navajo peacemaking are not legal philosophies or techniques. They are a way
of thinking and living. Peacemaking transforms individuals and communities
as its dynamics of participatory democracy, talking things out, consensus, and
respect-based communication move from formal courthouse settings for
peacemaking sessions to internalized habit in the people who come to know
it.140
According to the Navajo Nation Guide to the Peacemaking Program, any matter may
be submitted for resolution through mutual consent. Certain subject matters lend
themselves better to the process than others, including but not limited to family and
domestic matters, community relations (including “breaches of peace” as between
minority communities and police in Chicago), contracts, land and environmental
matters, property cases, and any other matter based upon agreement. 141 Participants
must include victims, the accused, family, community, other interested or affected
(indirect or peripheral interest).142 Unlike adversarial litigation, it is essential that
during peacemaking, “[n]o legal practitioner is permitted to participate . . . in [a]
representative capacity.”143
Without question, the number one value of peacekeeping circles is community
involvement, the entire community. Peacemaking circles have been described as
“community-directed . . . benefit[ing] communities by incorporating ‘local concerns’
. . . ‘local resources’ . . . us[ing] community based resources . . .” 144 When drafting the
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Chicago Consent Decree, the Illinois Attorney General attempted to engage the
community through a number of community roundtable discussions held in
neighborhoods throughout Chicago. 145 However, all parties—including the accused
police and their brothers and sisters in uniform—must be in the same room, not
separated as in a Westernized mediation situation.
Another key element to peacekeeping circles is that they are voluntary and
confidential.146 The Guide to the Peacemaking Program of the Navajo Nation notes
up front that the “peacemaking process uses consensual agreement of the parties as
the primary tool. Participation . . . is wholly voluntary.”147 Western litigation and even
alternative dispute resolution processes familiar in this country are grounded upon
an involuntary premise. Defendants (both criminal and civil), witnesses (and even
jury pools) are summoned to court against their wills. If they do not appear, a
contempt of court order will issue, a friendly sheriff will forcibly compel said
appearance, and fines and confinement may ensue. Even arbitration, especially now,
is often “compelled.” Employees are required to sign away individual statutory rights
in exchange for a job and then compelled to arbitrate any and all disputes. Likewise,
all collective bargaining agreements contain an arbitration provision requiring the
parties to submit to a grievance and arbitration process for any and all disputes. Often
times, however, unions must file a “complaint to compel arbitration” in federal court
to force an employer into the agreed upon dispute resolution of arbitration. In
requiring voluntary participation, “peacemaking is the complete opposite.”148
Likewise, confidentiality of the process is also crucial in Native American
peacemaking. One way to achieve this is not recording the process (unless all
participants agree): no audio, no “court” transcripts, no cell phone videos, no live
streaming, no website posts, no YouTube, etc. 149 According to the Peacemaking
Guidelines of the Navajo Nation, “[a]ll information and discussion in peacemaking
shall remain confidential and shall not be disclosed unless specifically agreed to by
all participants or otherwise required by law.”150 Confidentiality may be one of the
most difficult requirements of the Native American peace circle for the Chicago
situation to surmount in an era where absolute transparency is equated to the only
means to acquire accountability. Yet, confidentiality, including waivers of future
claims and litigation, within the peace circle promotes the real “discussions” (as
suggested, supra, by Michael Seng) needed to resolve deep harms. If confidentiality
and transparency are truly issues of concerns for the parties in the peace circle, they
can agree to different terms of this part of the process; however, the agreement must
be through consensus of all involved.
Indeed, confidentiality promotes the key procedural characteristic of peace circles—
honest storytelling. The form of “discussion” within reparative justice peace circles
focuses on participant storytelling. 151 As previously established, adversarial style
litigation stifles the storytelling of not only the victim, but the accused and
communities as well. The “stories” or “truths” of those involved in litigation is
orchestrated by others through rules of evidence, litigators, and judges.
Unlike adversarial proceedings in courts, arbitration or even mediation, the Native
American peace circle includes a non-authoritarian keeper or “peacemaker.” The
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“Peacemaker is not an adjudicator and does not sit in judgment,” according to the
Navajo Nation Guide to Peacemaking.152 Rather, he or she is a guide for
communication among the parties.153 Similarly, “rules of evidence” common in civil
and criminal courts, and often used to control, contain, stifle voice, are not the
jurisdiction of the peacemaker. There also is no “concern[] with matters of
jurisdiction, venue, pleading practice, or rules of court, etc.”154 Peacemakers are “not
judges, administrative hearing officers, mediators, or arbitrators . . .”155 Typically,
the peacemaker is someone of great respect in the entire community and “above
reproach.”156 “Peacemakers are persons known by their community for fairness,
wisdom, respect, and planning ability.”157 Such a job description eliminates most
politicians, judges, and attorneys. Additionally, at least in Navajo traditions,
Peacemakers become certified through a training process specific to those
traditions.158
The very nature of the peacemaker’s lack of adversarial, litigious authority necessarily
limits his or her ability to judge, order remedies, or resolutions to the issues within
the peace circle. Unlike the Chicago Consent Decree, which excludes the voice of the
rank-and-file of the Chicago police, resolutions of issues within the circle are achieved
solely through consensus from all participants in the circle—victim, victim’s family,
the accused, the accused’s family, and the community participants. This
characteristic, like confidentiality, is also a high hurdle to pass without significant
time, significant effort, and significant (metaphorical) bruising. Yet, there are many
encouraging success stories of peace circles resolving accusations of criminal charges
in America.
2.

Successful models of Native American reparative peace
circles in the criminal context

In the 1980s, a reemergence of more traditional dispute resolution approaches began
within Native American communities.159 Statistics from the restoration of this model
demonstrate “an increased sense of satisfaction and healing on the part of the victim
. . . a majority of offenders also felt satisfaction in the process . . . likely to decrease
the chance of offender recidivism.”160 Chicago already utilizes “restorative justice”
peace circles to stem the flow of students in underserved communities into the prison
system.161 Likewise, the John Marshall Law School operates a Justice Project in the
Back of the Yards that
works with students, administrators, counselors, and teachers from an
elementary school in Back of the Yards, an underprivileged and underserved
community, largely made up of Latino and African-American students, to
provide support for children with traumatic experiences, social-emotional
difficulties, chronic truancy, and anti-social behavior . . . 162
Typically, peacemaking circles of dispute resolutions have been used
successfully as an alternative in lower-level criminal justice systems. Beginning
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Minnesota began a practice of using
peacemaking circles to resolve disputes at the sentencing level. There,
“[s]entencing circles consist[ed] of members of the community who
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voluntarily gather to research a ‘consensus on how a case can best be resolved
with the goal of supporting the victim and reintegrating the victim and
offender into community life.’”163
Daniela Velez reports that conversations in peace circles even in Chicago middle
schools often widen into conversations about the broader community as a whole. 164
“Restorative practices in [Chicago] schools create safe spaces for difficult
conversations about the community at large” including “gang involvement and
affiliation, violence at school and in the community, racial and social issues.”165 No
doubt, part of the “safe space” is encouraged through the confidential, nonauthoritative, consensus-centered nature of the peace circle. Such an approach seems
particularly warranted and useful for the current crisis between the Chicago Police
Department and minority communities.
The women’s prison system in the State of California provides yet another example
of the transformative effect of peace circle reparative justice where the Prison of Peace
non-profit organization has been operating for over a decade.166 There, the essential
element of the project has been training inmates to become “peacemakers” through
the development of listening to both victim and accused offenders.
[T]here could be no introduction of actual mediation skills until the inmates
were adept at listening to others . . . Teaching the inmates how to listen by
paying close attention to emotions is very powerful . . . they were able to truly
listen to another human for the first time in their lives. . . . offering . . . the gift
of communication . . . just simply listening. It was also, for many, the fist time
they had ever been listened to. . . . To reinforce the listening skills . . . Peace
Circles are an ancient community process where listening is paramount . . . 167
Prison officials also reported that Prison of Peace directly resulted in “less violence”
and inmates “display[ing] leadership qualities that outweigh their past criminal
behavior.”168 The only reason a similar peace circle restorative justice method might
not work successfully in Chicago between the police and minority communities would
be the siren song of inertia pulling towards the jagged cliffs of fear of trying something
truly different and, instead, returning to inadequate litigation models that will not
resolve the underlying crisis in Chicago.
V.

CONCLUSION

William Calloway, a Chicago community activist who advocated for the release of the
McDonald dashcam videos succinctly summarized the crisis and need between
minority communities and police as follows, “We want to heal. We want to be able to
create better relationships between law enforcement and the black community.” 169
Zealous adversarial litigation models do not heal relationships. By design, they divide
and conquer the opponent, theoretically without blows. Yet the blows in Chicago
continue. Like the citizens of Rwanda after the horrors of genocide, returning to a
native reparative peace process in the throes of a Chicago crisis will not be easy.
Listening, consensus, confidentiality, waiver of litigious rights, and stepping away
from legal representation will all require deeply brave trust, compassion, and a
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counterintuitive willingness to lay down the arms of adversarial litigation
simultaneously on the part of all participants, including the City, the Mayor, and the
FOP.
To be sure, the Native American reparative justice model of peace circles does not
have the characteristics of adversarial style litigation like routine due process, rules
of evidence, legal representation, or trial transcripts that may be released to the public
or used in subsequent adversarial litigation. For many of these reasons, the gacaca
courts of Rwanda have been highly criticized and seen as political tools for the current
ruling party.170 Nevertheless, the process is wholly voluntary, fully communityoriented, leaves no voice left outside of the circle, and does not conclude without full
consensus of all parties. The current litigious system, violently imposed by occupying
colonial forces, is simply not working to heal the relationship between law
enforcement and minority communities. The voices of victims and accused, alike, are
marginalized despite recent best efforts of City and State officials and Attorneys
General. As a result, the relationship festers in crisis mode with each successive shot
fired by a police officer at a young black man, woman, or child and each subsequent
lawsuit filed in the current adversarial litigious court system.
Yet within this crisis, the words of Joy Harjo, the Nation’s Poet Laureate, again rise
for a contemplated resolution:
For any spark to make a song it must be transformed
by pressure. There must be unspeakable need, muscle of
belief, and wild, unknowable elements. I am singing a
song that can only be born after losing a country.171
The need for transformation stemming from generations of lives lost at the
“thirteenth floor” in Chicago is almost unspeakable. Indeed, sometimes the City feels
perpetually lost. Yet, the pressure sparked by community leaders and activists for real
change is present. The adversarial litigation mode does not fit this crisis. Instead, the
Native American reparative peace circle model is the Conflict Resolution for Holy
Beings and the path towards justice, voice, and healing for Chicago. 172

The first line of Joy Harjo’s poem “Conflict Resolution for Holy Beings” begins, “Recognize
whose lands these are on which we stand.” Joy Harjo, Conflict Resolution for Holy Beings, in
JOY HARJO, CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR HOLY BEINGS (W.W. Norton 2015), available at
<https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/141847/conflict-resolution-for-holy-beings>
(last visited Feb. 16, 2020). The University of Illinois is a Land Grant Institution and as such,
on July 26, 2018, the Office of the Chancellor at the University of Illinois Urbana -Champaign
(UIUC) published a Land Acknowledgment as a formal statement to be read at all UIUC events
in recognition and respect of Native peoples as the traditional guardians of the land upon
which UIUC now sits. This article adopts the following “optional” UIUC Land
Acknowledgment Statement suggested by Native American House: “I recognize and
acknowledge that we are on the lands of the Peoria, Kaskaskia, Piankashaw, Wea, Miami,
Mascoutin, Odawa, Sauk, Mesquaki, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Ojibwe, and Chickasaw Nations.
1
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These lands were the traditional territory of these Native Nations prior to their forced removal;
these lands continue to carry the stories [and voices] of these Nations and their struggles for
survival and identity. As a land-grant institution, the University of Illinois has a particular
responsibility to acknowledge the peoples of these lands, as well as the histories [and voices]
of dispossession that have allowed for the growth of this institution for the past 150 years. We
are also obligated to reflect on and actively address these histories [and voices] and the role
that this university has played in shaping them. This acknowledgement and the centering of
Native peoples is a start as we move forward for the next 150 years.” Land Acknowledgement
from Robert J. Jones, Chancellor, University of Illinois (July 26, 2018
)<https://chancellor.illinois.edu/land_acknowledgement.html> (last visited Nov. 27, 2019).
The first line of Joy Harjo’s poem “Conflict Resolution for Holy Beings” begins, “Recognize
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JOY HARJO, CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR HOLY BEINGS (W.W. Norton 2015), available at
<https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/141847/conflict-resolution-for-holy-beings>
(last visited Feb. 16, 2020). The University of Illinois is a Land Grant Institution and as such,
on July 26, 2018, the Office of the Chancellor at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
(UIUC) published a Land Acknowledgment as a formal statement to be read at all UIUC events
in recognition and respect of Native peoples as the traditional guardians of the land upon
which UIUC now sits. This article adopts the following “optional” UIUC Land
Acknowledgment Statement suggested by Native American House: “I recognize and
acknowledge that we are on the lands of the Peoria, Kaskaskia, Piankashaw, Wea, Miami,
Mascoutin, Odawa, Sauk, Mesquaki, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Ojibwe, and Chickasaw Nations.
These lands were the traditional territory of these Native Nations prior to their forced removal;
these lands continue to carry the stories [and voices] of these Nations and their struggles for
survival and identity. As a land-grant institution, the University of Illinois has a particular
responsibility to acknowledge the peoples of these lands, as well as the histories [and voices]
of dispossession that have allowed for the growth of this institution for the past 150 years. We
are also obligated to reflect on and actively address these histories [and voices] and the role
that this university has played in shaping them. This acknowledgement and the centering of
Native peoples is a start as we move forward for the next 150 years.” Land Acknowledgement
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